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MOOT COURT.
P. R. R. CO. vs. GREGORY.
Equity-Adequate remedy at law-Penalstatute unenforceable by bill.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Knox bought a railroad ticket from Harrisburg to St. Louis at reduced
rates. On the back of the ticket it was stipulated that the purchaser, in consideration of the reduced rates, would not transfer the same. Knox became ill,
and could not use the same, and subsequently sold the same to Gregory, a
ticket broker. This is a bill in equity for an injunction to restrain Gregory
selling the ticket.
Hassertfor plaintiff.
Gregory and Knox bound to use method of disposition provided by Act of
May 6,1863, P. & L. Dig. 3992. Criminal prosecution or action on contract inadequate to prevent sale.
Elder for defendant.
Act of Mfay 6, 1863, provides adequate remedy. Equity is concerned only
with property rights, and has no jurisdiction in personal wrongs, political
rights or crimes, or merely illegal acts. Kearns v. Hawley, 188 Pa. 120;
In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 210 ; Bispham on Equity, p. 57.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

J. :-The plaintiff named in this bill is a corporation in Philadelphia, incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
and is known, as the Pennsylvania R. R. Co. The defendant, one Gregory, a
resident of Cumberland county, is a ticket broker, and this bill is filed to restrain him from selliug a ticket purchased from one Knox, said ticket having
been purchased by Knox from the plaintiff named. The said Knox, by the
terms of the contract under which he purchased the ticket, was prohibited
from selling the same, but nevertheless did so. The bill further sets forth, that
whether Gregory was orwas not aware of the terms of the contract, he is guilty
of a misdemeanor if he sell the same, as the sale of tickets by one unauthorized
is contrary to the'Act of Assembly, and is made a crime by said act.
One of the elementary points in the bringing of an action of any kind is,
that he who is under the necessity of applying to courts to vindicate his rights
HELLER,
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must employ the appropriate remedy. It seems to me that this is clearly but
a charge of the violation of the provisions of the Act of Assembly of May 6,
1863. It is well settled that a bill, having for its sole purpose an injunction
against crime or misdemeanor, does not lie, but it is justas well settled, equity
will interfere if the alleged criminal acts go further and operate to the destruction of or diminution of value of property.
We have been unable to find in this bill any destruction or diminution of
the value of property, nor has it been set forth in the bill that any destruction
or diminution of value of property has taken place, or is liable to take place.
This bill is essentially a bill to enforce by injunction a penal statute. If it be
supposed that because an act is illegal merely, equity will interfere to restrain
it, it is a misapprehension of equity jurisdiction. "If an act be illegal," said
Chancellor Kendersley, in Solteau v. DeHeld, 2 Lim. and S. 153, "I am
not to grant an injunction to restrain an illegal act merely because it is illegal.
I could not grant an injunction to restrain a man from smuggling, which is
an illegal act." Nor could he for any merely criminal or penal 6ffense.
In the case of Sparhawk v. The Union Passenger Ry. Co., 54 Pa. 401, it
has been held, and is closely followed, that equity cannot interfere when there
is a remedy atlaw by statutes, which remedy must bepresumedto be adequate.
In the same case it has been held, and is followed in Klein v. Livingstone Club, 177 Pa. 224, that equity will not restrain an act which is illegal
merely.
It is apparent to the court that this is merely a bill to restrain an illegal
act, and also that there is at law by statute a remedy which the courts consider adequate. The court, therefore, dismisses the bill.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Knox, in buying the ticket for a trip from Harrisburg to St. Louis, stipulated that, in consideration of the reduced rates, he could not transfer it. If
this was a mere covenant, the breach of it no more vitiated the title acquired
by the transferee, than the breach of a covenant in a lease against assigning or
subletting makes the assignment or sub-lease void. Gregory became the
owner of the ticket, and the railroad company had no property right which
his subsequent sale of it would violate.
If the stipulation was a condition, the breach of it would prevent the passing of the ownership to Gregory, and any vendee from him would be equally
incapable of acquiring ownership. ' In that case, the railroad company would
suffer nothing by the sale by Gregory of the ticket.
The act of May 6, 1863, 1 P. & L. Dig. 1317, pl. 575, forbids sales of railroad
tickets by others than authorized agents, and makes such sales misdemeanors,
punishable by a fine and imprisonment. The preamble to this act indicates
that it is enacted because numerous frauds have been practiced upon unsuspecting travelers, and also upon railroads, by the fraudulent sales of tickets.
It is designed to benefit not only the travelers, but also the railroad companies. The legislature has chosen to give these companies such protection as
flows from the prohibition and penalization of the sales It has defined the
quality-and quantity of the penalty. We are of opinion that the companies
must be content with this. If the penalty is inadequate, the legislature may
be.applied to, to make it severer. If it is not enough to fine and imprison, let
the death penalty be annexed to -the offense by the law-making power.
Why should the chancellor attempt to reinforce the mandate of the legislature, by adding his own mandate? Why should he try to increase the penalty the legislature has provided, by supplementing it with fine or imprisonment imposed by himself as for contempt? When the legislature has forbidden the act, it would scarcely seem necessary to evoke a corroborative
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prohibition from a judge. And when the legislature has said what shall follow if its prohibition is disregarded, it seems gratuitous for a judge to say that
something else shall follow. We may safely infer that the entire task of
penalizing the act was undertaken by the General Assembly.
We cannot, therefore, but commend the learned. court below for modestly
declining to usurp a power not conferred upon it, and for allowing the defendant, if he disobeys the injunction of the law, to be found to have done so only
by a jury, after a trial in the customary common-law mode. The " thou shalt
not" of the legislature ought to need no supplement by a. "thou shalt not"
of a chancellor. If Gregory actually makes the sale in violation of law, he can
as readily be made to suffer the pre-appointed punishment as the ex-postfacto
punishment of the judge, imposed without the aid of a jury.
Appeal dismissed.
O'BRIEN vs. THE INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Assignmentof policy-Right of assignee to sue-Insurableinterest
in assignee not requiredwhere insuredpays premiums-Considerationnot
essential if delivery made-Bill in equity to compel payment to assigneeDemurrer.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The facts are set forth in the opinion of the lower court.
Reeser for complainant.
Insurance policies assignable by informal assignment. Scott v. Dickson,
108 Pa.6. Assignee maysueinhisown name. Actof March 14, 1873. A man
may insure his own life, paying the premiums himself, for the benefit of another
who has no insurable interest. Scott v. Dickson, supra; Hill v. Insurance
Co., 154 Pa. 29; Overbeck v. Overbeck, 155 Pa. 5. Creditor has insurable
interest. Wheeland v. Atwood, 192 Pa. 237.
Schwartzkopf for respondent.
Assignee must have insurable interest. Gilbert v. Moore, 104 Pa. 74; Ruth
v. Katterman, 112 Pa. 251 ; Downey v. Hoffer, 110 Pa. 109. Out and out assignment must be to one having insurable interest. Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

RENO, J. :-The respondent demurred to the complainant's bill. The facts
alleged in the bill must therefore be regarded as verity. Bitting's Appeal, 105
Pa. 517 ; Bussier v. Weekey, 4 Super. Ct. 69. The facts thus established are in
substance about as follows: A, the holder of an insurance policy, entitling him
to a sick indemnity of thirty-five dollars a month and one hundred dollars for
funeral expenses, signed an order to the insurance company, directing it to pay
all money due on account of his policy to the plaintiff. Two days later, and
before the company had acted upon the order, the insured died intestate, without heirs or next of kin, and with no creditors save the payee of the order.
The company refused to substitute O'Brien as beneficiary under the policy,
and, as a result, he brings this bill in equity, praying for an injunction to restrain the defendant from paying the money due to anyone else other than the
complainant, and for a decree requiring payment to be made to the complainant, and for general relief.
There is no averment or proof that O'Brien is the qualified administrator
of the deceased. Nor can the order to the insurance company, without proof
of probate, and of such other facts as will fulfill the essentials of a valid testament, be sustained as a will. The doctrine of Shad's Appeal, 58 Pa. 111, can
hardly be applied in the teeth of the statement of the case, which distinctly
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sets forth that the insured died intestate. Nor can we hold it a gift causa
mortis in the absence of proof showing the decedent's physical and mental condition at the execution of the order. Hence, if upheld at all it must be on some
ground other than those already suggested,
The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the order constituted a
valid assignment. A policy of insurance is a contract-a contract to pay upon
a certain specified contingency a stipulated stipend. As such, in the hands of
one entitled to its proceeds, a policy of insurance must be regarded as a chose
in action, and no doubt subject to the same incidents common to that species
of property. Ordinarily, it is not possessed of any of the characteristics of a
negotiable instrument, and it has long since been decided that a policy is assignable only in equity, and before the Act of March 14, 1873, P. L. 46, 1
(P. & L. Digest, col. 2377), suit could be brought only in the name of the assignor. Roussett v. Insurance Co., 1 Binn. 428 ; Gourdon v. Same, Id. 429;
Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 31 Pa. 428. The position of the law now is, that
while an insurance policy is assignable in equity, nevertheless action upon it
may be brought by an assignee in his own name. Act of 1873, supra, Cf. De
Bolle v. Insurance Co., 4 Whart. 67.
But the Act of 1873, supra, does not make the right of assignment absolute; e. g., where consent on the part of the insurer is prescribed as a condition precedent, such assent must. be had before an assignee is qualified to sue in
his own name. Mutual Aid Society v. Luppold, 101 Pa. 111. But the statement of the case at bar discloses no such conditions, and it is assumed that
none existed. Nor will an assignment of a policy of life insurance be sustained
unless the assignee has an insurable interest in theperson insured ; and, byan
insurable interest is meant, that tbe beneficiary bears some relation toward the
insured, that the preservation of his life would be advantageous to him; e.g.,
a relative by blood or marriage, a surety or a creditor. Courson's Appeal, 38
Pa. 438; U. B. Aid Society v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 324; Hoffman v. Hoke, Id.
377; Ruth v. Khtterman, 112 Pa. 251. Unless this insurable interest exists,
the contract is illegal as a wagering agreement, and void as against public
policy.
Had O'Brien an insurable interest in A's life? He does not appear to have
been a relative, either by blood or marriage-the statement of the case states
that the decedent left neither. He has not been shown to have been a surety.
Is he a creditor? The statement of the case says the deceased died "with no
creditors other than the payee of the order." Are we to infer from this vague
statement that the relation of debtor and creditor existed between O'Brien and
his assignee, as a result of dealings collateral to. or prior to, this assignment?
Or are we to understand that this assignment itself created the relation ? We
prefer to believe that the assignor died absolutely without creditors-that no
one had any claim against him or his estate, save O'Brien only, and his claim
arose only by reason of the assignment. It follows, then, that O'Brien had no
insurable interest.
But is it not a conceivable case for a man to be both the insured and the
beneficiary of an insurance policy? Can he not pay the premiums himself?
Such, indeed, is not an unusual state of affairs, and that is precisely what was
done here. And such a contract is not a wager, for manifestly a man has an
insurable interest in his own life. Can he assign that policy-one taken out
by himself, for his own benefit, and paid by himself-to a stranger who has no
insurable interest? Certainly such a case is to be distinguished. from one
wherein the person paying the premiums, and to whom the benefit is to accrue, has no insurable interest, or where the beneficiary assigns to a stranger
to the insured. It has been well said, that where the insured pays the pre-
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miums, and then designates an assignee (who has no insurable interest in the
insured) to receive the proceeds of the policy, the assignee is no more tempted
to crime than if he were made a legatee in the insured's will. Vide, prefatory
note to "Insurance," P. & L. Digest of Decisions, col. 14693. This principle
was very clearly recognized in Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6, which held that
one may insure his own life, pay the premiums thereon himself, for the benefit
of another who had no insurable interest in the insured. If that transaction
was upheld, how can we avoid this assignment? Is it any more a wager?
So, also, in Hull v. United Life Insurance Co., 154 Pa. 29, a payment by the
insurer to an assignee who had no insurable interest wassustained in an action
by the personal representatives against the company. Would not the defendant here be protected by a payment to O'Brien if sued subsequently by other
claimants? The case of Scott v. Dickson was followed in Overbeck v. Overbeck, 155 Pa. 5, where a policy, made payable to an illegal wife, was sustained.
We are not disposed to disturb this assignment in the face of these decisions.
Beyond collecting the principal, no duty is apparently imposed on O'Brien.
It is not shown that he was to pay any premiums in order to keep the policy
alive. Nor is there any evidence that the policy or the assignment, or both,
were not delivered to O'Brien, and we presume that as done which should have
been done. The doctrine of Trough's Estate, 75 Pa. 115, does not apply. No
consideration has been shown, but none need be shown in a gift inter vivos.
We have discussed the merits of the case, assuming that equity has jurisdiction. On reflection, we are not so sure that the plaintiff did not have an
adequate remedy at law. Were it not that the plaintiff prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant from paying the proceeds to one other than the
assignee, we would have been compelled to dismiss the bill. But we regard
this a sufficient reason for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction ; and when
equity once assumes jurisdiction, it will not relinquish it until complete and
final justice has been done.
Our judgment is, that the complainant is entitled to the proceeds of the
policy, and may vindicate his rights by invoking the aid of the equity side of
the court.
Demurrer overruled.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The bill asks for a decree requiring the company defendant to 11substitute
O'Brien as beneficiary under the policy." Since A is dead, the real purpose
of the bill is, evidently, to compel payment of the $100 to the plaintift. A bill
in equity against the company and the assignee of a policy was filed by the
executor of the assured, in Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438, but it was treated as
an interpleader bill. The company might properly file an interpleader bill,
when, admitting its liability to pay, it knows not to which of two competing
claimants it should make the payment. Masonic Aid Association v. Jones,
154 Pa. 99; Masonic Mutual Association v. Jones, 154 Pa. 107. The action of
assumpsit would, apparently, have furnished an adequate remedy for the plaintiff. We are not disposed, however, to reverse the learned court below for entertaining the bill. Cf. Jinks v. Banner Lodge, 139 Pa. 414.
It is not made to appear that the consent of the company was necessary to
the validity of the assignment. The assured signed an order on the company
to pay all moneys due to the plaintiff, and apparently, in some way, this order
was presented to the company. We think we can assume that this order was
an assignment of the money due on the policy. Beaumont Bros. v. Lane, 3
Super. 73; Oakes v. Oram, 43 Leg. Int. 520.
The only person who could claim the fund, were there no assignment, would
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be the administrator of A. On what ground can he dispute it? Apparently
the assignee was a creditor, and the assignment was made in payment of, or as
security for, the debt. But, it would not be invalid even if gratuitously made.
Judgment affirmed.
WILLIAMS vs. ROBERTSON.
Contract-Offerby telegraph-Telegraphcompany offerer's agent-MistakeOfferee not liablefor price he received.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Williams delivered to a telegraph company a message addressed to Robertson, in these words: "Will sell hundred flour at six ten net cash. Answer
quick." As received by Robertson, the word "ten" was omitted from the
message. He at once wired an acceptance, and resold the flour at six five. The
flour was delivered, and Williams drew on Robertson for the price at $6.10 per
barrel. Robertson refuses to pay more than $6.00 per barrel, hence this action.
Bowman for the plaintiff •
A mistake by telegraph avoids the contract. Hinkel v. Pope, L. R., 6Exch. 7. There can be a recovery on implied contract for quantum meruit.
Knauss v. Shiffert, 58 Pa. 152; Wright v. Rensens, 133N. Y. 305. Where contract is void, or not enforced, quantum meruit is the remedy. Stowell v. Lowell,
8 Pick. (Mass.) 178; Van Deusen v. Pelum, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 229.
Davis for the defendant.
Telegraph company was sender's agent. Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa.
302. There being no common intention, no valid contract exists. Clark, Contracts, 35, 36. Contract void where there is a mistake as to price. Id. 289.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BARNER, J. :-The question in this case is, whether or not the defendant

is liable to the plaintiff. The question of the responsibility of the telegraph
company, either to the plaintiffor the defendant, is not contested, and therefore may be passed by without deciding.
The English rule as to the formation of contracts by telegraph message is,
that the message as sent is the one which controls the contract. But the posi;
tion of the American courts on this point is exactly the reverse, holding by the
weight of authority that the message, as received, is the one which governs in
determining the terms. In the case at bar, therefore, the contract was legally
consummated on the terms of the contract formed by the message as it was delivered to the defendant, and accepted by him. We are, therefore, unable to
see wherein the statement of facts present a cause of action to the plaintiff in
this case.
A case almost identical with the one under consideration is found in 71 Ga.
760, The Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Shotter, where the plaintiff delivered to the company a telegram quoting pric on turpentine. The company
did not transmit the message as given, and, owing to the misquoting of the
price ofthe turpentine, loss was incurred. Here it was held that the merchant
should settle with his customer at the price fixed by the telegram as delivered,
and that the company should then respond in damages. In the case at bar,
the merchant is in possession of the definite amount of damages, and need not
bring an action against the defendant to ascertain that amount.
In a Missouri decision, Haubelt v. Rea & P. Mill Co., 7 Mo. App. 672, the
court said : " The rule is, that where one makes an offer by telegraph, he
th.ereby makes the telegraph company his agent for its transmission, and if it
jo altered in the transmission, he is bound by it as transmitted."
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It is the opinion of the court that the plaintiff should be non-suited. The
telegraph company was the agent of the plaintiff for the transmission of the
offer, at the selection of the plaintiff himself, and he is bound by their acts.
The second message (the acceptance) delivered to the telegraph company by
the defendant, does not enter materially into the case, since it is not alleged or
shown to have been incorrect, and consequently there was no misunderstanding or variance in that part of the transaction in which it might be shown that
the telegraph company was the agent of the defendant, or perhaps the agent
of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Plaintiff non-suited.
OPINION OF THE SUPREIE COURT.

Williams caused the telegraph company to make an offer of flour to Robertson. The company was directed to offer it at $6.10 per barrel, but, in fact,
offered It for $6.00 per barrel. The offer, thus made, was accepted by Robertson, and the flour was received by him and sold for $6.05 per barrel.
It can hardly be debated that, upon these facts, Robertson having sold the
flour, cannot be compelled to pay for it more than $6.00. Had he retained it,
the question might arise whether Williams could annul the sale on the ground
of mistake in the offer of its terms. We do not think such question can arise
under the existing'circumstances. Nor dowethink that Williams can recover
$6.05 for the flour. That price was in fact secured by Robertson, but it represents, in part, the compensation for his labor and skill in making the sale, the
interest on his investment, etc.
Judgment affirmed.
TIMARIUS vs. HOMOLD.
Perjury-No civil action-Merger of civil actions in criminalprosecutionsAct 31 March, 1860, See. 71.
STATEM!ENT OF THE CASE.

In a suit by William Oram against Timarius on a promissory note, the defense was that Timarius' signature was a forgery. Homold, a witness for Oram,
testified that he saw it executed by Timarius, and Oram received a verdict and
judgment for $1,000. Homold was subsequently convicted of perjury. Thisis
an action of trespass for the damages caused to Timdrius by his (Homold's)
testimony.
Reno for the plaintiff.
Perjury is a misdemeanor. Act 31 March, 1860, 14, P. & L. Dig. 1294.
At common law, there could be a subsequent civil action upon the same facts
constituting the wrong a misdemeanor. 4 Blacks. 6. This rule was extended
by Act of 31 March, 1860, 71, P. & L. Dig. 71, so that now a civil action is
not merged even in a felony.
McDonald for the defendant.
No civil action for perjury or subornation of perjury. Bostwick v. Lewis,
2 Day (Conn.) 447; Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 157; Taylor v. Bidwell,
65 Cal. 489; Damport v. Sympson, Cro. E. 520; Eyres v. Sedgwicke, Cro. J.
601. It would be an attempt to collaterally impeach a previous judgment.
Cunningham v. Brown, 18 Vt. 123.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BARNHART, J. :-It seems that in a former suit brought by William Oram
against John Timarius, the present plaintiff, on a promissory note for a thousand dollars, judgment was rendered against Timarius, because of the perjured
testimony of Titus Homold, the present defendant, who swore that he had
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seen Timarius execute the said note. Homold was subsequefitly convicted of
perjury, and this is a civil action against him of trespass for damages resulting
from his perjured testimony.
The question involved here is one of merger, i. e., has the civil action for
damages merged in the criminal prosecution for perjury? Inasmuch as there
is in Pennsylvania no statute directly on this question, the common law will
control. We find that at common law there was a distinction as to the merger
of a civil action in afelony and the merger of a civil action in a misdemeanor.
In the case of felony, it appears that the greater, namely, the criminal offense,
was so grievous and serious in its nature as to absorb the right to bring a civil
action. But it was held otherwise in the case of a misdemeanor. Here the
criminal action and the civil action were held equal, or nearly equal, so that a

suit would lie in each.
This is the common law as it was interpreted in Pennsylvania. Under the
Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382, 14, perjury was classed among misdemeanors.
As there has been no legislation changing the common law rule concerning
misdemeanors, the law now is that the civil action, in the case at bar, did not
merge in the criminal action, and that therefore the plaintiff can recover.
This rule has met with the general approval of our courts. Com. v. McGuire,
2 Pars. 341 ; 4 Blackstone 96; Clark's Criminal Law, 7 (1894) ; Chitty, in note
to Lewis' BI., Vol. IV, p. 1429.
The Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, 71, provides that "In all cases of
felony heretofore committed, or which may hereafter be committed, it shall
and may be lawful for any person injured or aggrieved by such- felony to have
and maintain his action against the person or persons guilty of such felony in
like manner as if the offense committed had not been feloniously, and in no
case whatever shall the action of the party injured be deemed, taken or aljudged to be merged In the felony, or in any manner affected thereby." It
appears that this act recognized and approved of the common law rule in reference to misdemeanors as stated above, and in no way changed that part of the
common law ; it only broadened the common law so as to make the rule the
same with felonies as had existed with misdemeanors. (See opinion of Parsons, J., in Com. v. McGuire, 2 Parsons 341, on the need of such legislation).
Judgment is therefore given for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Homold, it is alleged, committed perjury in the suit of Oram v. Timarius,
and by means of it secured for Oram a judgment for $1,000. That-the tort, if
any, was not merged in the crime of perjury is, we think, satisfactorily shown
by the opinion of the learned court below.
A deeper question, however, was pretermitted by the trial court, viz.

whether an action will lie for the giving of testimony, by means of which a
judgment has been recovered. The authorities are almost unanimous, that
the giving of such testimony, though untrue, is not actionable. Taylor v.
Bidwell, 4 Pacif. 491 (Calif.); Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 157; Damport v. Syrupson, Cro. E. 520; Eyres v. Sedgwicke, Cro. J. 601 ; Harding v. Hutton, 11;
Grove v. Brandenburg, 7 Blackf. 234 (Ind.). In Cunningham v. Brown, 18
Vt. 123 (1846), the very point was decided adversely to the right to sue, by Redfield, J. To suffer actions founded on testimony would, he suggests, be practically to retry the original cause. The court in which the action was tried
may set aside the verdict on the representation that the testimony by which it
was obtained was perjured, but, if it is allowed to stand, and judgment is entered on it, it is conclusive that the necessary allegations of the plaintiff therein were true.
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A witness cannot ordinarily be proven guilty of having perjured himself
except by other witnesses. These may as readily commit perjury as he. If
he is indicted, the law furnishes him protection against conviction, unless two
witnesses establish the perjury. There is no such principle invented for a civil
action. A vindictive party who has lost by the testimony would be under a
temptation to avenge himself by suing for damages, and by supporting his suit
by fabricated evidence. At all events, whether the reasons assigned are entirely satisfactory or not, the absence of authority for such suits as Redfield,
J., and others have suggested, is persuasive evidence that the common law has
not recognized the actionableness of perjury.
Judgment reversed.
BREEN vs. THE P. R. R. COMPANY.
Trespassfor damages-Ejectionfrom carfor tendering money forfare which
conductor thought counterfeit-Injuj to reputation as an element of the
damages sustained.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Breen, the plaintiff, offered to p~y his fare from a dollar bill, which the
conductor honestly believed to be counterfeit, and, refusing to accept it, ejected
the plaintiff. The bill was in fact genuine. Breen brought this action to recover damages, and seeks to have the injury to his reputation considered as an
element of damages.
Mfenges for the plaintiff.
It is no defense to an action for wrongful expulsion from a train that the
conductor was honestly mistaken. Gorman v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 97
Cal. 1; Laird v. Pittsburg Traction Co., 166 Pa. 4. If the ejection is wvrongful,
there may also be recovery by way of actual damages for mental pain and suffering, so called, including shame and mortification, which resulted to the
plaintiff, and the humiliation to which le was subjected and the indignity put
upon him. Laird v. Pittsburg Traction Co., 166 Pa. 4; 6 Cyc. 366. When,
however, one has established his cause of antion to his person, property or reputation, he may then recover for injured feelings and mertal suffering. 1 Jag.
on Torts, 369.
MacNeal for the defendant.
The slander was not within the general range of the servant's duties in the
course of his employment. The slander was not spoken for defendant's benefit, or in pursuance of any real or supposed duty to defendant, since the conductor, if he had taken counterfeit money, would have been charged with it.
Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381. A corporation cannot commit slander. Clark on
Corporations, p. 191. At the most, only nominal damages are recoverable.
O'Reilley v. Ry. Co., 17 Sup. 629; Henderson v. Ry. Co., 144 Pa. 476.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

HASSERT, J. :-Gentlemen of the jury, the question before you for your
consideration involves a statement of facts without precedent in the annals of
jurisprudence in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Breen, the plaintiff, was in a car of the defendant, common carriers, not
having purchased a ticket previous to boarding the same. Upon being asked
by the conductor for his ticket, Breen offered to pay his fare and tendered a
dollar bill in payment. The conductor, honestly believing the bill to be counterfeit, although it was in fact genuine, ejected Breen from the train. This is
an action in case to recover damages, and he wishes to have the injury to his
reputation made an element of the damages.
Every one must concede that Breen was a passenger on the defendant's
car. This is undoubtedly the case, as Breen had the intention of paying his
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fare, and did so as far as it was possible from his standpoint. Theprimafacie
presumption is, that a person riding in a public conveyance is a passenger, and
not a trespasser. P. R. R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339. Consequently, gentlemen
of the jury, you will be justified in arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff, Breen, was a passenger on the cars of the defendant company. The defendants, therefore, by the contract of bailment, owed to Breen the duty of exercising extraordinary care, and not the degree of care necessary to be shown
to a trespasser. The next question in logical sequence is, whether the honest
mistake of the conductor will preclude the liability of the company. In the
cases of Laird v. Pittsburg Traction Co., 166 Pa. 4; 36 W. N. C. 24, the doctrine
seems to be laid down that it will not. We believe that the plaintiff, Breen,
is entitled to recover in this action, but to what extent are the damages to be
estimated ? Counsel for the plaintiff contends that his client should recover
for injury to his reputation. This injury has been committed by the conductor
in the mere act of refusing to accept this dollar bill in payment, thus, according to counsel for the plaintiff, imputing to the plaintiff the offense of "handling counterfeit.money." If this position were supported, we imagine it would
produce considerable consternation in the legal world. Statistics tell us, that
of every one hundred coins purporting to be dollars coined by theUnited States
government five are counterfeit. To sustain the position urged by counsel for
the plaintiff would result in a multiplicity of legal suits of no consequence
whatever.
What, then, is the measure of damages? We believe it to be the correct
rule, when we charge you, gentlemen of the jury, to take into consideration
all the expenses of delay, and also to provide for payment for indignity of the
expulsion from the train, and to render a verdict accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The plaintiff offered a dollar bill in payment of the fare. What the fare
was does not appear. It was the duty of the defendant's conductor to make
change, if necessary. But the bill was not rejected because it was so large ds
to be beyond the conductor's power to change it. It was rejected for the sole
reason that, as the conductor believed, it was counterfeit. It was, in fact, genuine. It was refused at the peril of the defendant. It is not necessary for the
passenger to be armed with proof satisfactory to every conductor that the bills
he offers are not counterfeit. Whether the conductor was guilty of negligence,
undue ignorance or inexperience in distrusting the bill, must be immaterial.
The bonafides of the conductor cannot excuse his unfounded suspicion of the
genuineness of the bill, and his refusal to receive it.
That the improperly ejected passenger is entitled to damages, is undisputed. The learned court below has, however, refused damages for any injury
to the reputation of the plaintiff. This, we think, was proper. It does not
appear th at any others saw the ejection, or, if they did, knew the ground of it.
The refusal of a bill, on the ground that it is a forgery, does not imply an accusation that the offerer forged it, or knew that it was forged. Innocent men
are daily offering counterfeit notes or coins, and having them rejected. If the
conductor had refused the bill, and Breen had then given him an unquestioned
bill, he would have been allowed to continue on the car. The injury to Breen's
reputation would have been just as great, however, for it would have arisen
from the rejection of the bill on the ground that it was forged, and not from
the subsequent act of offering a substitute. But it would hardly be contended
that the opinion, that the bill was forged, leadiug to its rejection, would, of itself, had there been no ejection, have furnished a cause of action. No impeachment of the honesty of a man is implied in the refusal to accept from him
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a coin or bill on the ground that it is not genuine, and no tangible injury to his
reputation results.
We think, too, that the formation and expression of the opinion that the
bill is a forgery, is, on the part of the conductor, a privileged communication.
It is his business to see that he receives only genuine bills. When a bill is
offered him which he thinks forged, he has a right to say so. If he can, he
has a right to obtain another bill from the passenger. What the law does not
permit is the eviction of the passenger, as a means of extorting another, if the
bill is in fact good. To render actionable an expulsion by no means requires
the rendering actionable of the expression of the opinion that the bill is forged,
and the refusal, for that reason, to take it.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHNSON vs. SICKLES.
Releae-Joint tort-feasors-Intention of parties executiRn4 releage, as to its
effect, immaterial-D.'schargeof one inures to all.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Sickles and Kuntz were sued as joint tort-feasors by Johnson. Kuntz paid
Johnson his part of the sum asked for the damages, and received a release. He
now brings this action against Sickles for the other part, who defends on the
ground that the release to Kuntz relieved him from further liability.
.Hennekefor the plaintiff.
In actions of tort, nothing less than what in law is regarded a legal satisfaction of the tort by ode joint tort-feasor will operate to discharge the other
joint tort-feasor. Sloan v. Herrick, 49 Vt. 327 ; Seither v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 4 L. R. A. 54.
A judgment against one without satisfaction is no bar to an action against
any one of the other wrong-doers. Sission v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 348 ; Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 290.
Fox for the defendant.
A technical release, i. e., a writing under seal, purporting to release the
demand, etc., will, despite the plainest indications in the release itself of the
contrary intention, extinguish the claim against the other tort-feasor. Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149; Seither v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
JACOBS, J. :-This case presents the question, Does the release of one joint
tort-feasor, on his paying part of the damages claimed, after suit brought, extinguish the legal liability of the other joint tort-feasors ? It is a well settled
principle, that joint tort-feasors may be sued jointly or separately. If sued
separately, there can be as many judgments as separate suits. A judgment
entered against one of the joint tort-feasors, if sued separately, will not bar
suits against the other joint tort-feasors. But only one of the judgments can
be satisfied. If one of the judgments is executed, the money paid to the plaintiff, and the judgment satisfied, it will extinguish all liability of the other
joint tort-feasors. whether judgments stand against them or not. This on the
principle, that the payment of one judgment is a legal satisfaction for the
wrong, and the law will enforce but one legal satisfaction. Milliken v. Brown,
1 Rawle 391; Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 ; North Penna. R. R.
Co. v. Mahondy, 57 Pa. 187; Seither v. Phila. Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397; Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290. It follows, then, had a judgment been entered against Kuntz for the amount paid by him, whether by confession or by
suit, and thi%judgment satisfied, it would extinguish the legal liability of
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Sickles. Now, would the payment of part of the money claimed as damages,
and his release, have the same effect? Would it amount to a legal satisfaction ? It is argued that it was not so intended, and the release was only for
part of the damages, and could have no legal effect to the part not contemplated in the release. But would the intention of the plaintiff have any effect
if he had sued Kuntz separately for the amount he paid him, recovered it, and
pursued the judgment to satisfaction? Surely not. We have seen such would
extinguish the legal liability of Sickles, irregardless of intention. Then how
could payment of cash be less a satisfaction for his wrong than a judgment confessed or entered in a suit? Payment of the cash plus the absolute release
given by the plaintiff could not be less a legal satisfaction than an executed
judgment.
The cases cited by the plaintiff-Thomas v. R. R. Co., 194 Pa. 517, and
Gallagher v. Kemmerer, 144 Pa. 509-are not to the point. The court in both
cases found the release was not to a joint tort-feasor, and in Desore v. Hamilton, 14 C. C. 307, tie release was without legal satisfaction. The case of Traction Co. v. Seither is analogous, also Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149. These
cases hold, "The release of one of two joint tort-feasors is a discharge of both,
and this notwithstanding the mutual intention of the plaintiff and the defendant released was that such release should not affeeb the suit of the plaintiff
pendingagainst the other defendant." Therefore, verdict must be for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
When A has a claim, based on contract, against B and C, he may agree to
accept B's equitable part of it, and not to look to him for the rest, and he may
reserve the right to look to C for the rest of the debt. It ought not to matter
what the language of the instrument is, if this intention is clearly expressed.
That the act is called a release, or an agreement not to sue, ought to be entirely
insignificant, if the intention that A shall have recourse to C for C's part of
the debt. The aim of the courts should be to effectuate the intention of the
parties. Greenwald v. Kaster, 86 Pa. 45; Burke v. Noble, 48 Pa. 168 ; Klingensmith v. Klingensmith, 31 Pa. 460; Schock v. Miller, 10 Pa. 401.
If this is so with respect to a debt arising from contract, much more should
it be so in regard to a tort. Joint contractors are entitled to contribution.
Joint tort-feasors are not. Indeed, the sufferer of a tort perpetrated by two or
more has the option to treat them as several or joint. He can sue one or all,as he chooses. Though the law will not aid one tort-feasor to recover contiibution from another, it does not prohibit the sufferer to divide his loss or damage between them. He may take partial payment from one, and sue the other.
He may, having obtained a judgment against both, direct the sheriff to levy
on the goods of both, and, as nearly as possible, raise from the sale of them
equal parts of it. There is no good reason why, receiving one-half of the damages from X, the plaintiff should not give him a receipt, and stipulate not to
demand any more from him, but to demand the other half from the co-trespasser, Y. It ought not to matter much whether the language used is "release 11or some other word, if it is clear that this is what is meant. Unfortunately, however, there are authorities that teach that if a "technical ") release
is made, i. e., a writing underseal, purporting to "release" the demand, action,
etc., it will, despite the plainest indications in he "release" itself of the contrary intention, extinguish the claim against the other tort-feasor. In short,
the use of a certain formula is permitted, only on the condition that it shall
have an effect which the parties most manifestly intend that it shall not have.
Abb v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 68 Pacif. 954 (Washingtov State) ; Gross v.
Ellison, 136 Mass. 503. This principle was adopted by the trial court without
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eliciting marks of disapproval from the Supreme Court, in Williams v. LeBar,
141 Pa. 149, the lower court saying that "The discharge of one joint trespasser
is that of all ; notwithstanding the mutual intention of the plaintiff and the
defendant discharged, that such discharge should not affect the suit as against
the other defendants." In Seitber v. Phila. Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397, the
plaintiff had suffered from a collision between the car of the People's Passenger Railway Co., in which he was riding, and a ear of the Phila. Traction Co.
The former denied its negligence, but nevertheless paid $6,000 to the plaintiff, who thereupon released it from all liability, but stipulated to sue the
Traction Co. and to repay the $6,000, if so much was recovered. It was held
that this release was a bar to recovery against the Traction Co. The reasons
are obscurely stated. The plaintiff, it was said, had obtained one satisfaction;
he was not entitled to a second. But, until the jury passed on the evidence,
it could not be known whether the $6,000 was satisfaction, or only half or quarter satisfaction. It is suggested that the plaintiff, in the suitagainsttheTraction Co., admitted that the People's Co. had not committed any negligence.
If this was so, there were no joint tort-feasors, and the release of the People's
ought not to have had any effect on the right to recover from the Traction.
Thomas v. R. R. Co., 194 Pa. 511.
It must be observed that the case before us exhibits simply a release of one
tort-feasor without reservation of a right against the other. It seems impossible to avoid the application of the principle that "an unqualified release of one
shall work as a release of all," artificial as this principle is.
In cases of contract, it is necessary to hold the release of one joint debtor
the release of all, in order to give full effect to the release, since, otherwise, if
suit could be brought against the unreleased debtor he could, in turn, sue the
co-debtor. All that the latter would gain by the release would be the substitution, as creditor, of his co-debtor, for the original creditor. But, as there is
no contribution between tort-feasGrs, this result would not follow, from the
doctrine that a release of one of two tort-feasors does not release the other. It
would have been quite sensible to have held, therefore, that when a plaintiff
singled out one of several joint wrong-doers, for the purpose of releasing him,
he did not indicate an intention to release the rest, nor did he furnish any
reason of justice or convenience for holding that, despite his intention, he released the rest. Since we have not made the law, however, we are not responsible for it.
Judgment affirmed.
HERVINS vs. LONDON ASSURANCE CO.
Fireinsurance-Partial
loss-Liabilityof insurerfor increase of cost of repairs
caused by enactment of building laws-Effect of building laws on fire insurance contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A partial loss occurred under a policy of fire insurance, and the cost of restoring the building to its former condition would have been $30,000. Owing
to the building laws, however, the structure could be repaired only by the expenditure of $45,000, and this is an action to recover $45,000.
Jones for the plaintiff.
Cited Penna. Co. for Insurance on Lives, etc., v. Phila. Contributionship,
etc., 201 Pa. 497; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Copeland, 86 Ala. 551; Caraben v. Royal
Ins. Co., 63 Hun. (N. Y.) 82; Sherlock v. Ins. Co., 21 N. Y. App. Div. 18;
Cummings v. Ins. Co., 192 Pa. 359; 16 A. & E. Encyc. of Law, 964.
McDonaldfor the defendant.
Cited Penna. Co. v. Phila. Contributionship, 201 Pa. 497.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

EHLER, J. :-Ordinarily the terms of an insurance policy govern the liability incurred thereunder in a particular case, unless they have been waived
by the parties thereto. The insurer, by liniiting the amount up to which he
insures, does not, except in a valued policy, bind himself to pay the whole
amount, if the thing insured is destroyed, and he is not estopped from demanding proof of the actual loss incurred.
His undertaking is only to indemnify for loss actually suffered, not exceeding the amount named in the policy. Insurers, if the risk is not great, do not
object to over-insure in order to earn a higher premium, since they know they
will only be liable for actual loss, and generally the assured's valuation of the
property is taken.
Some policies fix the liability to the "actual cash value of the property at
the date of the fire," and of course here evidence of such value will be received
and the liability thereby determined. Cummings v. Ins. Co., 192 Pa. 359.
In the case at bar, the stipulations of the policy, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, are presumed to be those contained in the ordinary policy of
insurance, as per Act of 1891, P. L. 22, providing the standard form of policies
of insurance.
The ordinary rule applicable being, that if the thing insured is not totally
destroyed, but remains wholly or in part in a deteriorated condition, the insured can only claim the value of the injury actually done, unless all that remains of the thing insured be surrendered by the insured. What has been
lost must be made good by actual payment or reinstatement.
In the case at bar, a partial loss has occurred, and the cost of restoring the
building to its former condition would have been $30,000, had not the building
laws directed that certain specifications be followed, which increased the cost
by $15,000. Plaintiff seeks to recover $45,000. Assuming that the amount of
the policy was at least $45,000, and there being no question as to defendant's
liability as to the $30,000, the question limits itself to the effect of the building
laws upon this contract of insurance.
The contract being one of indemnity against loss up to a certain amount,
and where there is but one policy from one company, the insuring company
would be liable up to that amount depending upon the loss. The question
here is: Does the $15,000 form part of the loss against which the company insured? It could not be contended that the company would only be liable for
the cost of the material necessary for rebuilding at the market price existing at
time the contract was made. But it would be subject to the fluctuations of
the market as regards the price of these materials, and if the market price at
the time of the fire was greatly in excess of the market value at the time of issuance of the policy, the company would nevertheless be bound to pay for the
reconstruction up to the amount of the policy. It is evident that the policy is
made with reference to changed conditions, for the purpose of estimating liability at the time of thp loss. Were this not so, in cases of partial loss the insured might be called on for the excess of the market value, and the policy lose
its essential characteristic of indemnity for loss up to a certain amount.
The policy provides for compensation for loss to the owner by reason of injury or destruction by fire, and if in consequence of a state of law existing at
the time of the fire, the loss was increased above what it would have been by
reason of these building laws, then, surely, this is part of the actual loss thus
incurred, for it does not necessarily follow that the market value of the building will be increased by following the provisions of such building laws. As a
matter of fact, the building will contain a less amount of floor space than it
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did before if the walls are to be constructed thicker. If the loss is to be ascertained with respect to the changed conditions at the time of the fire, and if
this is part of the actual loss, then it ought to be borne by those who indemnified against it.
It has accordingly been held, that in ascertaining the loss reaulting from
the partial burning of a building covered by a policy of insurance, the true result is to be reached by taking the cost of reconstruction, according to the conditions existing and lawfully imposed at the time when the fire occurred. If
a change in the building laws requires walls of an increased thickness in the
rebuilding, the increased expense must be paid by the insurance company up
to the extent of the amount designated by the policy. Penna. Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Phila. Contributionship, 201 Pa. 497.
It has been contended that. if this be true, a local law preventing the erection of frame buildings within certain areas would have the effect of compelling an insurance company to erect another building of brick or other
material, costing much more than the frame building insured. But, it must
be remembered that the company in no case is liable for more than the amount
of the policy, and, if such building is only partially destroyed, it may be repaired, since such ordinances only prevent the complete erection of such buildings, and if totally destroyed the entire amount of the policy would be consumed. Neither can the act be held to impair the obligation of contract, as it
rather enhances the obligation. Insurance companies in these cases may increase the risk proportionately where it is evident that the building insured is
not constructed according to the requirements of the General Building Act of
May 5, 1899, P. L. 193, or they might provide against such liability.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The destruction by fire was but partial, and the loss that has resulted to
Hervins is the cost of so repairing his building that it will be in as good condition, and as valuable, as formerly.
The cost of such repair depends on the prices of material and labor at the
time. These may be higher or lower than they were when the policy was
issued. In either case, the company would have to pay the cost of the repair.
The cost of repair may be increased or diminished by the operation of laws existing at the time of making the repair. These laws may increase or diminish
the cost by impeding or facilitating the process of repairing; e g., by forbidding the use of streets fordepositof materials; by limiting the number of hours
daily when work could be done, etc. They might increase or diminish the
cost, by requiring different material, thicker walls, etc. Laws of the former
class would increase the cost of repair, without increasing the value of the building, when repaired, beyond its former value. Laws of the latter class might,
in increasing the cost of the repair, also increase the value of the building.
There is no appreciable reason for holding, if the laws are of the former
class, that the company shall not be liable for whatever expenditure is necessary to so repair the building as to restore it to its former state. Hervins v.
London Assurance Corporation, 184 Mass. 177 ; Penna. Co. for Ins. v. Phila.
Contributionship, 201 Pa. 497.
If, however, the laws prohibit an exact restoration of the building, but require it, if repaired at all, to be so repaired that it will be better, and more
valuable, there is no reason for making the company liable to expend a sum
that will thus increase its value. In marine insurance it is usual to make an
allowance to the insurer for the increase of value caused by the repair. 184
Mass. 177, supra. There is no reason for not making such allowance in fire insurance cases. In 201 Pa. 497, supra, it was found that the market value of
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the reconstructed building was no greater than it would have been had it been
rebuilt according to the original plan, and of the same materials.
The evidence developed before the jury in the court below did not show
what the building laws were, nor how they increased the cost of repairing,
but the court distinctly asserted that if they required an increased thickness
of walls, the company would have to bear the entire expense of them. This
ignores the consideration that a building, with the increased wall-thickness,
being safer and more durable, would possibly be worth more than the original.
It might be worth $5,000 or $10,000 more. Are we to so interpret the contract
of insurance as to make it obligatory on the company to enrich the assured, in
case of fire, by giving him a better building, if only the laws forbid a rebuilding after the model of the original ? We are not prepared to sustain such a
principle. Insurance is a contract for indemnity. Its aim is to preserve from
loss, not to bestow a gain.
It does not appear that the building laws underwent a change between the
issue of the policy and the fire. But, if they had, we do not think the result
would differ from what would follow had the laws existed when the policy
was issued. It must be assumed that the parties contemplated the possibility
of a change of the laws, and their effects upon the expense of repairing and rebuilding. 201 Pa. 497, supra.
As the verdict of the jury, for aught that appears, was founded on the assumption that, though the effect of the building laws was to cause the production of a better building, the whole increased expense of the repairs was
chargeable to the defendant, it is necessary that there should be a new trial.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
WAGNER vs. SHARPE.
Trespass-Negligence-Contributorynegligence not imputable to one who rescues anotherfrom imminent danger
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Wagner, who was passing along the highway, discovered an infant playing in front of defendant's warehouse. The defendant had, without looking
out on the street, started a barrel of flour down an incline, which would have
killed the child but for the quick action of the plaintiff. Wagner, in rescuing
the child, had his foot crushed to such an extent that it became necessary to
amputate it. This is an action to recover damages for the injury.
Acker for the plaintiff.
The defendant was negligent. R. R. Co. v. White, 88 Pa. 327; Hydraulic
Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332.
Plaintiff not guilty of contributory negligence.' Eckert v. Long Island R.
R. Co., 43 N. Y. 505; Spooner v. R. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 22; Gibney v. N. Y.,
137 N. Y. 1 ; Linneharev. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506 ; Penna. Co. v. Laicgendorf,
48 Ohio 482; Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 482; Corbin v. Phila., 195 Pa. 461.
Hahn for the defendant.
Defendant not negligent. Rodgers v. Leis, 14 Pa. 475. No proximate
cause shown. Wood v. R. R. Co., 186 Pa. 456.
Plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. Morrison v. R. R. Co., 56 N.
Y. 302; R. R. v. Hummel, 44 Pa. 375.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

BARNHART, J. :-As it appears, the defendant was in the act of rolling a
barrel of flour from his wareh use into the public street, when, at the same
time, a child was playing in front of the building, and in the linein which the
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barrel was rolling. It was clearly evident that unless the child should be
speedily rescued from its perilous position that inevitable death must follow.
It was a moment when delay meant death, and when quick, sure and heroic
action might save the life of the child. The plaintiff, who was then passing
along the street, comprehended the situation and, at the risk of his own safety,
rescued the child, but in doing so his foot was so severely injured that it became necessary to resort to amputation. He now brings this action to recover
damages for the injury sustained.
The first question to be considered, we think, is that of negligence. We
are clearly of the opinion that the defendant was negligent. The child was
playing in the public street, and so far as it appears, there was no reason why
be should not have been there. There is no evidence that the defendant gave
any warning of the danger which those passing by were likely to encounter.
In the absence of such defense, we think we are right in presuming that no
such notice existed. In Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332, it was shown
that defendant had a private alley running from the street back to his mill,
and that at the entrance of this alley he had posted a notice to the effect that
the alley was private, that there was no admittance, and that the entry way
was barred by a gate. Against the side of the mill, in the alley, the defendant
had fastened a heavy platform, which he was accustomed to swing downward
parallel to the earth, and use for the purpose of loading and unloading grain.
When not in use, the platform was leaned against the side of the building.
From this position it fell forward upon four children, and severely injured two
of them. In an action for damages, the defendant was held to have been negligent, and judgment for damages was entered against him.
The case at bar is much more favorable to the plaintiff than the case just
referred to. Here the defendant, without looking, rolled the barrel of flour
down the incline into the street, and apparently regardless of the safety of any
who might chance to be there. We, therefore, have no hesitancy in saying
that the defendant was grossly negligent.
Let us now inquire as to whether the plaintiff is chargeable with negligence. We do not think that he is. Even though the danger were greater
and the risk more hazardous, the plaintiff could not be held guilty of contributory negligence. In case of imminent danger the rescuer is not required to
act with sober and deliberate thought. Some allowance for rashness is to be
made in his favor. It is not demanded that he act in perfect self-possession.
When human life is at stake he may be excused for making a somewhat rash
decision. Under such circumstances one may expose his life or limb to a high
degree of danger, and is not accountable for his error of judgment likely to
arise from the haste and confusion of the moment. Penna. Co. v. Langendorf,
48 Ohio 316 ; Linnehare v. Sampson, 126 Mvass. 506.
In Eckert v. Long Island l. l. Co., 43 N. Y. 503, a leading case, plaintiff's intestate rescued a child from defendant's track in front of defendant's
approaching and negligently run train. The court held that plaintiff could
recover, saying, "The law has so high regard for human life that it will not
impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons." This
doctrine was approved in a later New York case, Spooner v. D., L. and W. l.
R. Co., 115 N. Y. 22, where the plaintiff was injured in an attempt to rescue a
child whose foot was fastened in a negligently constructed track.
In Gibney v. The State of New York, 137 N. Y. 1, a father, mother and
child were passing over a bridge, when the child fell through a hole, which
was insufficiently guarded. The father, in an effort to save the child, plunged
through the hole after it, and both were drowned. The wife recovered from
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the State, it being held guilty of negligence in having the bridge in a dangerous condition.
In The Maryland Steel Co., of Sparrow's Point, v. Mamey, 88 Md. 482,
the court went so far as to lay down the law to be, that where one receives an
injury while rescuing another from danger, caused by the negligence of thdefendant, the rescuer is not debarred from recovery by his own contributory
negligence. It is not necessary to go to this extreme in order to decide this
case.
Corbin v. Phila., 195 Pa. 461, is perhaps the leading Pennsylvania case on
this question. There the city of Philadelphia had dug a deep trench within
the city limits. At the bottom of this trench weresome gas pipes, fromwhich
a large quantity of gas escaped, so that it was extremely dangerous to be in or
about the opening of the trench. The trench was left unguarded, and there
was no notice to warn the public of the danger. Some school children, who
were playing ball in a neighboring lot, knocked the ball intothe trench, and
it rolled to the bottom. One of the children descended a ladder standing in
the trench, for the purpose of getting the ball. He was overcome by the gas,
and lay prostrate at the bottom. The plaiutiff's son, seeing the danger the
boy was in, quickly started down the ladder after him. He, too, was overcome by the gas, and before he could be rescued died. The plaintiff recovered
damages from the city.
We think that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and therefore judgment
is given for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

It will hardly be seriously contended that one wofild be exercising ordinary care who would throw a projectile of any kind into a frequented thoroughfare without looking to see if a passer-by were near. To start a barrel of
flour down an inclined plane toward the sidewalk is but slightly different from
throwing a missile. Its momentum would probably be greater, the difference
in velocity being quite counterbalanced by the greater weight.
If, then, the defendant is to avoid the consequences of his negligence, it
must be on the theory that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
This raises the interesting question as to the effect of benevolent motives as an
excuse for rushing into danger.
The learned court below has cited to us the case of Corbin v. Phila., 195
Pa. 461, which, he says, "is perhaps the leading Pennsylvania case on this
subject." So far as we have been able to discover, it is the solitary Pennsylvania case on the subject. If it is the leader, we have not found the followers.
The case was decided by a divided court, the judges standing four to three,
Justice Mitchell leading the dissenters. The investigation of the learned court
below seems to have been limited to a cursory reading of Corbin v. Phila. His
entire discussion of this point should have been credited to the opinion of Justice Brown in the case mentioned.
Deference to the foregoing precedent may have justified the position taken
by the learned court below. The position of the dissenting judges, however,
detracts greatly from the force of the decision, and as the opinion of the majority is destitute of a single original thought on the question, we feel constrained toregard the question as an open one in Pennsylvania, and one worthy
to be considered on principle.
Volenti nonfit injuria. One who assents to the infliction of damage is not
in law wronged. One who is careless of his person or property can fairly be
said to have invited injury, and if such injury occurs, the law forbids that he
should blame the negligence of another for it. In the case before us, the plain-
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tiff saw danger, and rushed to meet it. Did he not invite the result that occurred? We believe it to be clear that, on principle, the plaintiff has no case.
Only a flagrant piece of judicial legislation can help him.
"A rescuer," says Justice Brown, "one who, from the most unselfish motives, prompted by the noblest impulses that can impel man to deeds of heroism, faces deadly peril, ought not to bear from the law words of condemnation
of his bravery, because he rushed into danger, to snatch from it the life of a
fellow-creature, imperiled by the negligence of another, but he should rather
listen to words of approval, unless regretfully withheld on account of the unmistakable evidence of his rashness and imprudence."
Now, it is submitted, this is not a question as to whether a man shall be
"condemned "for his bravery, or applauded for it. The question is, shall the
defendant be required to pay damages?. The sentiment that has impelled Mr.
Carnegie to create his hero fund is shared by all mankind. The hero should
not suffer. He should be rewarded. But who should pay the reward? That
is the question.
Let us suppose that A is in danger. A is himself negligent, so that in case
of injury he can blame no one but himself. B's negligence, however, is a contributing cause of the dangerous situation. C notices A's peril and attempts a
rescue, but is injured in effecting it. Had not C intervened, B would clearly
have been free from liability to pay damages for the injury to A. Is it, then,
fair to permit C, an intermeddler, to rush in and, by receiving the shock of
the injury in A's stead, impose a liability on C? A was the one saved, or attempted to be saved. He, too, was negligent. Ought he not rather be the one
called upon to reward the hero ?
But, it may be objected, the child was not negligent in the present case.
If the plaintiff had not intervened, the child would have been hurt, and the
defendant would have had to pay damages to the child. Let us grant this.
Does it follow that the plaintiff should recover ? Does he ask to be subrogAted
to the rights of the child? Is he to receive the speculative damages which the
jury may conjecture the chld might have suffered? Does he prove that his
fears, that the child would not escape by its own energy, were well founded?
Not at all. He asks to be compensated for the damage he himself has suffered.
Suppose the plaintiff is the president of a great corporation, drawing a fabulous salary. Shall the defendant have imposed upon him this new measure of
damages? A sum that would have adequately compensated the child for an
injury would be "but a drop in the bucket'" toward satisfying the claims of a
trust manager.
The plaintiff saw a chance to do an heroic act, and he decided to run a risk.
His heroism consists in his self-sacrifice. If his heroism is genuine, he would
abhor the suggestion that he was animated by mercenary motives. He is applauded as a hero. His is all the eclat, all the glory. When this feature of
the performance is over, he comes to the defendant, who has received only
condemnation, and demands that the defendant pay all the expenses of the exhibition. And Justice Brown and the learned court below say this is just, and
the defendant must pay the cost. The defendant had no chance to elect
whether the plaintiff should perform or not. The plaintiff decided to run the
risk without consulting the defendant, yet the defendant is required to bear
the brunt. If the interest of the State demands that heroism be rewarded, let
us not have the spectacle of the hero suing in court to recover it, but let the
State create a fund, as suggested by President Roosevelt in his recent message,
and let all heroes, not merely railway train men, be rewarded from this fund.
Again, suppose the attempted rescue fails. Both the would-be rescuers
and the one to have been rescued are injured. The plaintiff saved the defend-
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alt nothing. Can he double the defendant's liabilities simply because his motives were good?
The rule, as laid down by Justice Brown, has a curious limitation. One
may still be guilty of contributory negligence, though he be trying to save life.
He must not be "too rash." He must show a "due regard" for his own safety.
"It is his duty to exercise his judgment as to whether he can probably save
the child without serious injury to himself." The attempt must not be made
"under such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons." The only ground for a recovery in any of these cases is an
"emotional basis of admiration for heroism," as Justice Mitchell expresses it.
Yet, when we find the true hero, the court balks. Who has done the nobler
act, the man who expected to escape, or he who was morally certain that he
must suffer in the other's stead? The acme of altruism exhibited by the
founder of Christianity, the religion of altruism, was the voluntary and intentional sacrifice of His own life for the lives of others. Do the courts mean to
"condemn" such an act, while applauding the man who hoped to save himself also, but failed? That the courts set this limit on their rule, instead of
following it to its legitimate conclusion, convinces us that they have a secret
realization that they are confiscating private property to secure the means
wherewith to reward heroes; but to save their faces they still say that in extreme cases there may still be allowed the defense of contributory negligence.
We regret exceedingly that we are compelled to submit to the case of Corbin v. Phila. Because of this decision, the judgment must be affirmed.

BOOK REVIEW
By William
Trickett, LL. D., Dean of the Dickinson School of Law. Rochester: The
Lawyer's Co-operative Publishing Co. 1904; 884 +Ixxiv pp.

THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT IN PENNSYLVANIA.

Dr. Trickett's latest contribution to the legal literature of Pennsylvania is
a very successful attempt to meet a large demand for a logical, exhaustive and
practical treatise on the rights and dihties created by the very common relation of landlord and tenant In a volume of large proportions, the law of two
thousand cases has been collated, digested and arranged in a manner valuable
alike to the veteran and the tyro in practice. Even a cursory inspection will
convince the reader that accuracy and clearness of statement have not been
sacrificed to brilliancy of diction, but that the whole law has been stated concisely yet adequately. To clarify the law, thd facts from which it is deduced
are in many instances fully set forth, making the work at once a text and a
reference book. The rights, subjects, place and method of distress receive
treatment commensurate with their importance, as do also the tenant's remedies for an improper exercise of this right. The various Acts of Assembly,
particularly those of 1772, 1830, and 1863, are construed and explained. The
pubjects of mining leases and oil and gas leases, which have acquired considerable interest by reason of the comparatively recent development in those
fields, are accorded generous space. A comprehensive and most searching
index completes this very useful book. It is not too much to say that the
book should be in the library of every Pennsylvania lawyer.

THE FORUM
HANDBOOK OF TrE LAW OF INSURANCE.

65

By William -eynolds Vance.

St. Paul, Minn.: West PublishingCompany, 1904.
An indicium of the commercial expansion of our country may be noticed
in the marvelous growth of the insurance business. A study of the records of
the Insurance Commissioners of various states will prove a revelation to the
unlearned. To one gleaning the law reports, it is apparent that litigation
along insurance lines has kept pace with the wonderful growth, for as contracts of insurance have been varied and methods of business changed, new
questions have arisen resulting in disputes between insurer and insured which
the courts have been called upon to settle.
. No apology, therefore, need be made for the appearance at this time of
another text-book on insurance law, and verily no apology is needed on behalf
of the valuable work just published, the subject of this review. Without invidious comment, it may be asseverated that the present work is the best of
that cataclysm of works on insurance with which the profession has been deluged of late years.
Following the usual Hornbook style, the treatise is in one volume, but unlike some recent publications on insurance, the author covers, fairly although
cursorily, the salient features of both marine and fire, life, accident andliability
insurance. 'The order of the book is fashioned after that of the standard works
on the same subjects. Especial mention ought to be made of the admirable
and instructive historical introduction, which adds mightily to the intelligent
grasping of the matter following. The difficult department of insurable interest in life policies is handled with consummate skill, and on the question of
a creditor's interest in the life of his debtor, the author's comments as well
as the citations commenting on our doubtful rule in Ulrich v. Reinoehl, 143
Pa. 238, are of immediate moment to Pennsylvania readers. It is questionable,
however, whether, as stated on page 137, those who had invested money- in
preparations for the King's coronation, had an insurable interest in the life of
the English monarch, and the passage would seem to be in contradiction of
the author's sentiments expressed on page 145. The law pertaining to insurance agents is discussed succinctly, as are also the constructions of the courts
on various clauses of the standard policy. In the index are appended copies
of the New York standard fire policy and the usual marine policy of America.
It is suggested that the marine rule of one third new for old might have been
included in the law peculiar to marine insurance. Byrnes v. National Insurance Co., 1 Cow. 265; Wambaugh's Cases, 807. On the whole, the work of the
author has been done faithfully and creditably and will prove a valuable adjunct to the library of both lawyer and student.
ANNOTATED INTERSTATE COMMIERCE ACT AND FEDERAL ANTI-TRuST LAWS.

By William L. Snyder.
P. xxiii, 880.

New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co.

1904.

In this book have been collected all the Acts of Congress whose purpose it
is to "curb the trusts." It will be a surprise to many of the members of the
profession to know that the author has also collected over two hundred and
fifty decisions involving the interpretation of this legislation.
Among the important statutes collected are the Sherman Act, the Elkins
Act, the*.Expedition Act, the Act creating the Bureau of Corporations, the
Telegraph Acts, and the Railway Safety Appliance Law. All amendments
to these laws are also set out in full. The provisions of the Constitution of the
United States delegating to Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce
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are collected and discussed. The limitations of this power and the scope of the
police power and the power to tax retained by the states are discussed in the
light of numerous decisions. The text of the Interstate Commerce Act isgiven
in full and its value to the shipper as a protection against unreasonable charges,
local discrimination in rates, and against pools and combinations is fully
shown. It is particularly timely that this presentation of the present powers
of the Interstate Commerce Commission be made at this time; when Congress
and the country generally are discussing the propriety of a great extension of
its powers.
Among the anti-trust decisions the Northern ,SecuridiesCase is, of course,
given the fullest discussion. The case is carefully analyzed and the views of
the different justices presented in detail. This is followed by an extended
comment by Judge Dillon on the effect of the decision. The suits against
"The Sugar Trust," "The Pipe Trust," "The Coal Trust," "The Railroad
Trust" and "The Beef Trust" are likewise discussed in detail.
The book ends with a collection of the Rules of Practice before the Interstate Commerce Commission together with appropriate forms to be used in
proceedings before the Commission.
As a whole the book should prove a great time-saver to the busy practitioner while its discussion of the law, as it is, regarding trusts, should prove
of great popular interest as well. Indeed, the subject dealt with is one of such
absorbing interest that we may safely predict for the book an extended sale to
laymen as well as to lawyers.

